Keynote Speakers
Amy KindRussell K. Pitzer Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Claremont McKenna College
"Imagination, Fantasy, and Desire"
Abstract: Can imagination be morally assessed? On first thought, it might seem that the answer is clearly no; what we do within the privacy of our minds is our own business. As George Sher has claimed, “the realm of the purely mental is best regarded as a morality-free zone. Within that realm, no thoughts or attitudes are either forbidden or required” (2019, p. 484). When it comes to imagining, this general claim has special pull. Other things equal, simply imagining a morally reprehensible act does not seem problematic. After all, the imagining might well be in the service of figuring out how to avoid or mitigate it. But what if someone takes pleasure in imagining morally reprehensible acts? What if they engage in such imaginings repeatedly? And what if the imaginings are targeted at a particular real-life individual? In this talk, I explore questions about whether (and why) acts of imagination might be morally problematic, focusing largely on the case of fantasy. |
Amandine CatalaProfessor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada Research Chair on Epistemic Injustice and Agency
"A Pluralistic Account of Epistemic Repair"
Abstract: Recent accounts of epistemic agency and injustice have shown that both notions are greatly enriched and more accurately construed when they are taken to include not only propositional knowledge (knowing-that) but also experiential knowledge, including practical knowledge (knowing-how) and tacit, embodied, and affective knowledge (knowing what-it’s-like). What can such a pluralist account tell us about epistemic repair? This paper aims to tease out the implications of a pluralist account of knowledge, epistemic agency, and epistemic injustice for epistemic repair. The paper is divided into two main parts. In section 1, I introduce what has been termed a “pluralist” account of knowledge, epistemic agency, and epistemic injustice, explaining why it is descriptively more complete and normatively more inclusive, and why it might therefore be useful for projects of epistemic repair. In section 2, I draw on this pluralist account to develop an original account of epistemic repair. I propose a fivefold framework to flesh out what epistemic repair involves, centered around five questions: (i) what are we repairing, or the objects of epistemic repair; (ii) who is repairing, or the agents of epistemic repair; (iii) why or with what aim, or the goal of epistemic repair; (iv) where, or the sites of epistemic repair; and (v) how, or the mechanisms of epistemic repair. I illustrate my account of epistemic repair with two examples: one from the Indigenous context and one from the neurodiversity context.
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Location
This year's 61st annual meeting will be held at the Humanities Centre (which is referred to as "HC" in class descriptions). It location can be found using the University's Campus Maps tool.
